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Causality in Contemporary American Sociology:
An Empirical Assessment and Critique1
Brandon Vaidyanathan,
Michael Strand,
Austin Choi-Fitzpatrick.
Thomas Buschman, Meghan Davis and
Amanda Varela

Abstract: Using a unique data set of causal usage drawn from
research articles published between 2006–2008 in the American
Journal of Sociology and American Sociological Review, this
article offers an empirical assessment of causality in American
sociology. Testing various aspects of what we consider the
conventional wisdom on causality in the discipline, we find that (1)
“variablistic” or “covering law” models are not the dominant way
of making causal claims, (2) research methods affect but do not
determine causal usage, and (3) the use of explicit causal language
and the concept of “mechanisms” to make causal claims is limited.
Instead, we find that metaphors and metaphoric reasoning are
fundamental for causal claims-making in the discipline. On this
basis, we define three dominant causal types used in sociology
today, which we label the Probabilistic, Initiating and Conditioning
types. We theorize this outcome as demonstrating the primary role
that cognitive models play in providing inference-rich metaphors
that allow sociologists to map causal relationships on to empirical
processes.
Keywords: American sociology, causality, cognition, epistemology,
metaphor

INTRODUCTION

Causality has a checkered history in sociology. Questions like whether sociologists can
legitimately make causal claims and whether causality is necessary in order for sociology
to be a science have received different and conflicting answers in the history of the
discipline (Mullins, 1973; Bernert, 1983; Platt, 1996). Recently, leading theorists and
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methodologists have taken strong positions on the role it should or should not play in
sociological inquiry (Goldthorpe, 2001; Morgan and Winship, 2007; Porpora, 2007;
Abbott, 2007; Gross, 2009; Reed, 2011; Martin, 2011). While these debates have
highlighted and reaffirmed the significance of causal arguments for shaping the field (to
good or ill effect), little has yet been resolved about how sociologists should make causal
claims or whether they should be making them at all. Moreover, the presumption
underlying many of these critiques is that causal claims are being made in sociology and
in a specific way. However, there has not yet been any attempt to record these claims as
they actually occur in the field, which is to say, in published research articles.2
In this article, we attempt to fill that gap and offer a reflexive contribution to these
debates. Our starting point is not whether causality constitutes good or bad sociology,
but instead how prominent causal claims actually are in current sociological research,
what these claims look like and therefore how fundamental causality is for the
sociological field in practice.3 This reflexive approach to causality has some precedent.
Andrew Abbott (2001), for instance, offers the thought experiment of a historian in the
distant future poring over sociology journals in order to make sense of the
weltanschauung of today's “native” practitioners. Using this perspective, Abbott argues
that current sociology is preoccupied with “causal analysis” and that it suffers from
glaring inconsistences between theory and method as a result. To his future historian,
“variable relationships” are how today’s sociologists identify causality, but it isn't what
they mean by it or how they make causal arguments in writing. Our methods may commit
us to a view of "general linear reality,” but our concepts commit us to something else
entirely. Thus, Abbott concludes that contemporary sociologists “live within a view of
social reality that [they] don’t really believe” (2001, p. 98; see also Snijders and
Hagenaars, 2001).
Others have raised similar criticisms regarding the treatment of causality in
contemporary sociology (Goldthorpe, 2001; Porpora, 2007). Like Abbott, these authors
usually provide reflexive (though less imaginative) accounts of causality in the field and
use these observations to make recommendations for addressing present problems.
However, and also like Abbott, their empirical treatment of causality is minimal, usually
drawn from a narrow convenience sample of introductory or methodological textbooks.
This article focuses on an area largely neglected in prior analysis: documenting
the nature of causal claims found in published research. Specifically, we ask: Do
contemporary American sociologists make causal claims in their research? If so, how
and when do they make these kinds of claims? To answer these questions we
systematically examine usages of causality in focal arguments of all articles published
between 2006-2008 in the American Sociological Review and the American Journal of
Sociology. We find that metaphorical language is fundamental for how these articles
make their central claims. Cognitive linguistics provides techniques best suited to
identifying the nature of these claims, allowing us to classify these metaphors according
to how they enable a specific conceptualization of causation (Lakoff and Johnson 1999).
that
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This process yields three causal types that appear in sociological research articles: the
Probabilistic, the Initiating, and the Conditioning. We find that the third type, the
Conditioning Causal claim, is the dominant mode through which contemporary
sociological articles express their focal arguments and claims.
Our analysis of this unique dataset contributes to the sociology of scientific
knowledge, highlighting the role of cognition in shaping how sociologists make causal
claims. This also suggests some limits of philosophical and methodological self-criticism
regarding best practices. Our analysis shows that causal claims-making in the field is
most contingent on concepts that have thus far eluded theoretical critique. These are the
inventory of metaphors—for example, “produces,” “enhances,” “triggers,” “springs
from,” “mediates,” “accompanies,” “creates”—that sociologists draw from with an
astonishing level of consistency to make claims about their empirical findings. We claim
that these metaphors do not do trivial work. In the causal claims that we find in these
articles, objects (neighborhoods, parents, genders) “enable” other objects or events; one
process “generates” or “accompanies” another, while still another “impedes” the growth
of something else. These metaphors are essentially where the action is in the standard
sociology research article. It therefore seems clear that they are pivotal for deciphering of
an article’s claims.
In this article, we argue, drawing from cognitive science, that these metaphors do
refer to causal relationships, and that these articles therefore make causal claims.4 Our
primary goal in this article is to demonstrate and support how this is true, and in the
process empirically map out the nature of causal claims-making in sociology today.

CAUSAL METAPHORS AND COGNITIVE MODELS

We take a cognitive approach to explain how sociologists make causal claims and why
they do so in patterned ways. Here we draw on the precedent of the strong program in the
sociology of science’s application of cognition to scientific thought (Bloor, 1976; 1982).
We also draw from Fleck’s (1981[1935]) seminal work on “thought styles” in science,
and Zeruvabel’s (1999) updating of this problematic in the form of scientific “thought
communities.” However, we depart from these prior applications of cognition insofar as
we use cognition less as a metaphorical or theoretical placeholder, with little inherent
substance, and more as an empirical psychological process as revealed by research in
cognitive science (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999; 1980; Giere, 1988; Talmy, 1988; JohnsonLaird, 1980).
While we draw from this research to make our case for the importance of
metaphors for causality in sociology, our approach should be considered “cognitive”
primarily in the sense in which Stephen Turner (2007) understands the term. As Turner
notes, many of the problems of sociological theory (from the classical period up to today)
stem from adopting anti-realist views of the mind and building theories that don’t attempt
to reference empirical psychology. From this perspective, a cognitive criterion in theory
choice is one that tries to ensure that arguments do not presume an unrealistic view of the
mental, without “minimizing the cognitive.” While we do not come armed with brain-
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scanning technology to make our cognitive-based claims, we analyze our data in such a
way that cognition is given a primary place in the explanation. Our focus on causality is
determined not by a philosophical standard, but by the standards of cognitive science. In
this instance, our empirical approach uses evidence made relevant by theories of
cognition.5
The difference cognition makes in this regard becomes clear when comparing it
with a rhetorical analysis, which is the framework that is usually drawn upon to explain
the use of metaphor in science (Gross, 1996, pp. 81-82). This perspective implies that
metaphors have no conceptual significance and are instead “sophistic” tools used by
scientists to establish scientific authority and persuade readers. This means that there is
only an aesthetic or stylistic constraint on their usage, and they are not essential to the
nature of the claims being made in a scientific article. A cognitive perspective, on the
other hand, recognizes that metaphors carry a great deal of the conceptual load in a
research article—in most cases they are directly involved in reporting the key empirical
claim. Moreover, semantic differences alone do not appear able to capture the set of
inferences produced by applying the metaphors. Indeed, because of how closely these
metaphors are woven into the argument of each article, one type of metaphor cannot be
traded for another without serious consequence.
The tendency to view metaphor as rhetoric, and to dismiss these metaphors as the
site of causal statements, is ultimately based on the idea that causality has or should have
only one true meaning. Because thought (especially scientific thought) is conceived as
literal from this perspective, relationships not directly stated (i.e. something “causes”
something else) are mere obfuscation. However, we find that, given the multiple
metaphoric renderings of causation, and the heavy conceptual load that metaphors appear
to carry in these articles, this explanation is unconvincing.
Instead, the “imaginative” application of metaphors appears to be a pivotal aspect
of the scientific research process. Not only that—and perhaps counter-intuitively—
metaphors are fundamental to causal best accounts of empirical findings, and thus are not
easily extricable from them without great loss. Here our argument about the conceptual
role of metaphors parallels Nancy Cartwright’s (2004) claim about the role that “thick
causal concepts” (like “sucked,” “feeds,” “enriches,” “clogs”) should play in causal
arguments in science. She frames this as a critique of formal models of causation (that
generally only use the term “cause”) in the natural sciences.6 In the same sense, if we
rarely found an article that uses the term “cause” this is not evidence that sociologists are
reluctant to make causal claims; it is because the term “cause” is so inference-poor that it
actually does a shabby job capturing causal relationships. A metaphor—like
“triggered”—does much better.
As mentioned, we draw a long list of metaphors out of these articles, each of
which appears to be making some type of causal claim. But our analysis reveals that these
metaphors can be classified together into different groups according to how they “hang
together
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together” and bear a common causal meaning. Drawing from Lakoff and Johnson (1999),
we find that the meaning of the metaphors ultimately rests in underlying cognitive
models, which is the basis for their common classification. 7 Thus, we argue that the
metaphors found in sociologists’ causal arguments are animated and rendered meaningful
by the richly inferential, causal-logic structure of three cognitive models: the
Probabilistic (PC), the Initiating (IC) and the Conditioning (CC), with the Conditioning
being the most prominent in sociological research.
TESTING THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
A number of prior studies have evaluated causality in American sociology and made
several distinct, and often highly critical, claims about it. Given the redundancy and
persistence of these claims, together they constitute something akin to conventional
wisdom. However, as mentioned above, these claims are not grounded by thorough
examinations of how causality is (or is not) used in the discipline. We fill this gap by
examining all research articles published in ASR and AJS between 2006-2008. To analyze
these data, we first draw a set of research questions from prior arguments in order to test
the conventional wisdom and thus establish a clear line of relevancy for current debates
about causality in the discipline.
(1) Variables-language
Jasper and Young (2007, p. 273) identify the existence of “misplaced concreteness” in
sociological claims, which they define as “variables inflated into concepts and theories,
just as theories are reduced to one or two variables.” Porpora (2007) argues that there is a
“causal confusion” in American sociology, reflecting the centrality of variables-based
analysis in the discipline. He identifies an empiricist bias that results in a tendency to
skirt over conceptual considerations and cut to the empirical as quickly as possible,
especially when dealing with troublesome concepts like causality. This has created a
sharp distinction between causality and interpretation, reducing causality to testable oneliners about associations between variables (Porpora, 2007, p. 201). According to
Goldthorpe, “where the ultimate aim of research is not prediction per se but rather causal
explanation, an idea of causation that is expressed in terms of predictive power [is] likely
to be found wanting” (2001, p. 14). Thus, published research that expresses ideas of
causation in terms of “predictive power,” or “variables language,” would represent an
incongruity pointing to a deeper, more fundamental confusion about causality in the
discipline. Such concerns lead us to our first research question: What is the most common
view of causality in contemporary American sociology? Implicitly, we ask: is it the
covering law model, based on “variables-language”?
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(2) Causality and Methodology
For Bernert (1983), the history of causal usage in sociology is dictated by methodology.
Methods are not conceptually innocent, but rather drive much of the thinking behind the
causal claims sociologists make. This echoes Abbott’s (2001) claim about the disconnect
between theory and method (because methods contain their own causal theory), and
Collins’ (1984) view that methodologies are both descriptive and explanatory. From this
perspective, we would expect, for instance, the additive view of causality to be dictated
by the use of linear modeling methods. Conversely, we might expect research articles
based on more qualitative methods to make less associational and more direct causal
claims. In order to evaluate whether such claims represent the state of the discipline, we
ask: Do different types of causal claims correlate highly with specific methodologies? In
particular, do quantitative studies make unique types of claims?
(3) Causal Mechanisms
As Gross (2009) suggests, there is a tendency in recent scholarship to identify
“mechanisms” in order to overcome the causal “black box” and extract more valid causal
claims from relationships between variables. The notion of mechanisms appeals to
scholars critical of the covering-law model championed by positivism and its
“variabilistic” approach of finding correlations between categories and events.
Mechanisms indicate explanations of, rather than merely statements about, the causal
connection between variables (Elster, 1989, p. 4). Despite the pervasiveness of the
concept and its longstanding use in the sociological lexicon (Hedström and Swedberg,
1998, p. 4-6), debate continues regarding its meaning and utility. For instance, a recent
review finds 24 distinct definitions of the term in current use (Mahoney, 2001, p. 579580). This multitude of use suggests mechanisms serve as a “root metaphor”—a takenfor-granted conceptual tool that is used ambiguously (Aro, 1993, p. 91). Our third general
research question holds aside theoretical debates about the nature of mechanisms, and
asks: Is appealing to the notion of mechanisms a common way to make causal claims in
American sociology today? And to examine whether the use of this notion is simply an
artifact of methodology, we ask, are quantitative articles less likely to do so than those
based on qualitative methodologies?
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This study introduces empirical findings drawn from content analysis of articles in the
two leading journals in American Sociology: the American Journal of Sociology (AJS)
and the American Sociological Review (ASR). These journals are central to the discipline,
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both as an outlet for research as well as a venue for empirically driven overviews of
larger book projects. Taken together, they represent a window into the mainstream of
contemporary professional sociology (Leahey, 2008). The ideas, assumptions and
approaches exemplified by articles published in these two flagship journals are widely
cited and often emulated, both within sociology (Allen, 2003; Phelan, 1995) and beyond
(Giles et al., 1989). We agree with assessments that the double blind review process
results in articles that better (and more consistently) represent the state of the field and
lead to greater conservatism regarding new approaches and paradigms compared to books
(Smilde and May, 2010). While recognizing the tremendous amount of innovative work
that emerges from books, this study does not address similarities and differences in causal
approaches between books and articles.
Our primary analysis is focused on the contemporary state of the field, for which
we draw on the complete population of 233 articles in all issues of both journals between
2006-2008.8 Descriptive data gathered from each of these articles included methodology,
types of funding acknowledged (i.e., internal, external-private, external public), and
data/methodologies used (up to three types). Because funding sources and author gender
did not, in our analyses, have any bearing on the types of causal claims or methodologies
used, we omit them from our presented results. Table 1 presents the methodologies used
in the population of articles between 2006-2008.
The principal data we gathered consisted of types of causal statements that were
used in articles for making their central or focal claims. We limited these to the sorts of
claims which (a) connect the article’s title, abstract, and conclusion; (b) are often
preceded by language such as “we argue that,” “this paper finds that,” “our results show,”
“we conclude that,” and so on; and (c) usually have consistency across the article in the
explanans and explanandum. In other words, we looked for the kinds of claims that the
authors might make in an “elevator pitch” summarizing their study. We identified these
focal statements in the Abstracts and the Discussion/Conclusion sections of articles,
recognizing these sections as the most likely venues in which the articles’ central claims
were made. 9 Having identified these focal statements, we categorized them into three
types of causal claims that we discuss below by asking whether each claim could be
reworded as an instance of one of these types. We then coded whether the article’s focal
claims were made using any of these three types (recording up to one instance of each) in
the Abstract and the Discussion/Conclusion.
Coding Causality
Coding causal claims in science is a process made doubly difficult by philosophical
disagreement over what legitimately counts as a causal relationship. This is probably
why it has (to our knowledge) never been systematically done before in the social
scientific
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Table 1. Key descriptive statistics of articles, AJS and ASR, 2006-2008
AJS

Number of articles
Methodology
Cross-sectional data analysis
Longitudinal / panel data analysis
Time series / cohort analysis
Historical case studies, non-comparative
Multilevel model analysis
Social network analysis
In-depth / focus group interviews
Event history analysis
Historical / comparative case
Content analysis/discourse analysis
Ethnography / participant observation
Mathematical modeling / formal theory
Experiment / audit study
Spatial data analysis / GIS
QCA / fuzzy set analysis
Theoretical

ASR

Total

N

%

N

%

N

%

106

45%

127

55%

233

100%

55
49
43
39
31
27
25
18
17
16
12
9
6
6
3
3

24%
21%
18%
17%
13%
12%
11%
8%
7%
7%
5%
4%
3%
3%
1%
1%

25
19
18
16
14
11
10
8
11
6
2
7
5
3
1
3

24%
18%
17%
15%
13%
10%
9%
8%
10%
6%
2%
7%
5%
3%
1%
3%

30
30
25
23
17
16
15
10
6
10
10
2
1
3
2
0

24%
24%
20%
18%
13%
13%
12%
8%
5%
8%
8%
2%
1%
2%
2%
0%

Note: Due to coding for up to three methods used, methodology percentages do not sum to 100%.
All percentages shown for Number of articles, Methodology, and the Total column are
percentages of the total sample.

sciences. However, as noted above, our task took an unexpected turn once we
encountered the widespread use of metaphors in these articles. These quickly (though
surprisingly) became the target of our coding efforts, and we realized that causal claims
were much less straightforward to us only when we allowed theories of what causation is
(or should be) to join the party. Terms like “determines,” “triggers,” “enhances,”
“conditions,” “accompanies” or “predicts” sparked debates among co-authors over
coding them as causal. These debates involved justifications that tested the causal process
implied by the term with a theory of what causation should be (whether this theory was
fully explicated or not).
The inconsistency between what, on the face of it, seemed like a causal clam and
what, using theory, contradicted that sense, led us to ask whether it wasn’t the metaphors
themselves that were doing the bulk of the conceptual labor in these passages and thus
guiding our coding. But how could that be? While the metaphors appeared to yield causal
meanings, we couldn’t justify exactly why they did. We found a ready answer in Lakoff
and Johnson’s argument that “causation is a multivalent radial concept with inherently
metaphorical senses” (1999, p. 226; emphasis added). Following this line of reasoning,
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that “the fundamental role of metaphor is to project inference patterns from the source
domain to the target domain,” we could also account for the varied, but non-random, use
of different metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, p. 128; emphasis added). Our task
now was to boil these metaphors down to prototypes that provided the source domain that
fit out the causal “inference patterns” of each metaphor as it was applied to a target
domain of relationships between empirical objects. In this way, we classified each of the
metaphors according to the prototypical causal-logic structure that it best fit.
Initiating Causal Claim (IC). These are causal claims that adopt the following structure:
Initial state X  forced movement from state X to state Y because of force F in object P
 subsequent state Y. The metaphors they identify for this type share in common a
conception of causation as forced movement: “bring, throw, drive, pull, push, propel,
thrust, and move” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, p. 184, emphasis original). Claims using
such terms can typically be restated as “the forces found object P are responsible for
causing a shift from condition X to condition Y.” The unfolding, temporal structure built
into these kinds of claims makes them resemble “billiard ball causation” (Cartwright,
2004).
Conditioning Causal Claim (CC). These claims evoke a type of figure-ground
relationship in which causation is conceptualized as the transfer of a “possessible object”
to or from an entity, rather than as forced movement, which is the case in the first type.
The figure-ground relationship is such that: Figure = Effect; Ground = Affected Entity.
Here, the causal force is applied to the effect, rather than to the affected party (i.e. the
family context gives a cumulative advantage [Figure] to upper middle-class youth
[Ground]). Such claims cannot be simply reformulated as an “X causes Y” statement;
instead, they must be rephrased as “X is the context or condition under which Y is
caused.” Alternatively, we could characterize the difference between this type of causal
claim and the previous one as a concern with ground rather than with figures. Such
causal claims are made using terms such as “conditions,” “affects,” “shapes,” “mediates,”
and “contributes to.”
Probabilistic Causal Claim (PC). These are claims in which causation is conceptualized,
at least implicitly, as correlation—“X varies with Y.” For instance, this is present in
statements such as: “Pressure goes up with an increase in temperature. Homelessness
came with Reaganomics” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, p. 218, emphasis original). In
addition to this “correlation is causation” metaphor, also common is the “probability is
distribution” metaphor—or the view that “the probability of an event happening to an
individual in the future equals the distribution of occurrences of these events happening
to a large enough sample of the population in the past” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, p.
219-220). Together, these two metaphors give us the notion of probabilistic causation:
Variable Y is highly correlated with Difference D in the Distribution of Variable X; thus,
Y causes Difference D in the probability of Occurrence of Variable X.
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At this point, the objection might be raised that “correlation does not equal causation”
and thus the kinds of claims that use the terms “accompanies,” “is associated with,”
“varies with,” or “predicts” should not be coded as causal. Such correlations are, at best,
indicative of causes, and that making causal claims using these terms requires additional
effort to rule out confounding factors. However, not all uses of probabilistic causal claims
carry this caveat emptor. The much larger point that the “correlation is not causation”
problem raises is that all instances of causal usage are fundamentally about processes of
forced movement (Talmy, 1988). On the one hand, this explains why correlational claims
are often treated or understood (mistakenly or not) as causal; on the other hand, it reveals
that correlational arguments, drawing from the probabilistic prototype of causality, are
not fundamentally dissimilar from other kinds of causal arguments, they just involve a
different process of forced movement. Indeed, only when there is an insufficient
resemblance to this prototype of causation do we cease to characterize what happens as
casual.
Thus, the essential difference between the different types of causal claims
involves the “determining factor” (or force) driving the causal process. If for IC claims,
this is found in a key object that starts a causal process, then in CC claims, force is
located in an environment to which affected entities are exposed. For PC claims, force is
also found in a key object, but its effect is not initiating but associative; it simply leads
another object to manifest itself in a certain way. On this basis, metaphors are rendered
more or less appropriate relative to the kind of determining factor (object, environment or
association) that is detected in a target domain.10
While additional (or even competing) claims may be made in the body of an
article, our focus on the Abstract and Discussion/Conclusion sections reflects a sense that
these are the sections where the most attention is paid to specifying the article’s main
claims (including central causal relationships). Since we conducted thorough textual
analysis and not simply word counts, we were able to discern those arguments originating
from the article’s author(s) and those originating elsewhere. That is to say, we read the
usage of the term to discern its purpose in the framework of the article. Thus, we did not
code causal claims that were made by others whom the article’s authors were merely
citing (i.e., claims that were not incorporated into the article’s focal arguments).
These causal claims were recorded in a spreadsheet by two independent coders,
each of whom coded the entire sample. We coded for the presence or absence of such
claims in the Abstract and Discussion/Conclusion, recording up to one instance of each of
the three claim types in each of the two article sections. The coding yielded an average
inter-coder reliability statistic of Cohen’s Kappa = 0.70 and average percent agreement of
88.9%. Subsequently, all instances of disagreement between coders were discussed to
arrive at a consensus.
We propose this coding scheme as an initial effort to advance a typology of
naturally-occurring causal claims in sociology. It is our hope such a resource might add
concep
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conceptual clarity to future discussions of this issue. This typology is by no means an
attempt to resolve ongoing debates over causality in the philosophy of science. We record
practical logic and use, rather than broad philosophical implications or authorial intent.11
Literal Causal Language. We also coded for the presence or absence (1, 0) of instances
of terms such as “cause,” “causal” and/or “causality” in the Abstract and
Discussion/Conclusion. In addition to our categorization of the types of causal claims
discussed above, recording instances of literal causal language allowed us to assess the
extent to which contemporary sociologists are willing to explicitly reference causality.
We recorded causal language in two variables. The first variable captured instances in
which the language of causality was used in order to make the article’s central claims—
for example, “colonial policy was overdetermined by an array of causal processes”
(Steinmetz, 2008, p. 15) and “racial territoriality and animus induced by social change are
a direct cause of antiblack hate crimes” (Lyons, 2007, p. 848). Some authors, however,
used such causal language in reference to their central claims and arguments, but did not
make a causal claim. For example: “further work is needed to clarify these causal
relations” (Schneiberg et al., 2008, p. 656). Such usages were recorded in a second binary
variable.
Mechanism Language. We coded for the presence or absence (1, 0) of the use of the term
“mechanism” in the Abstract and Discussion/Conclusion. Similar to our coding of causal
language above, we used two separate variables to record instances in which mechanism
language was used in making the article’s focal questions or claims, or when such
language was used in other ways.
FINDINGS
In what follows, we first discuss the types of causal claims we found, and subsequently
present statistical analyses of some of our results in order to address our three research
questions. Table 2 presents key terms that resulted from our coding. While we anticipated
greater mutual exclusivity among the three categories of causal claims, we found that
some of the indicative terms could fall into different categories. For example, metaphors
such as “increases,” “decreases,” or “accompanies” are in some cases used in a
probabilistic sense (PC), such as statistical correlations, whereas in other cases they were
used to indicate conditioning effects (CC). We strove to remain consistent with our
coding decisions in categorizing even these ambiguous terms according to which family
of metaphors the particular usage best fit with—that is, whether the term could be
rephrased as “X is a cause of Y” (IC), “X conditions or provides the context for Y” (CC)
or “X varies with Y” (PC).
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Table 2. Examples of causal metaphors in AJS and ASR, 2006-2008
Initiating Causal (IC)
Claim

Conditioning Causal (CC)
Claim

Probabilistic Causal (PC)
Claim

Affects
Amplifies
Conditions
Constrains
Depends on
Empowers
Enables
Encourages
Enhances
Impedes
Increases / Decreases
Influences
Is a function of
Is contingent on
Makes it difficult for
Mediates
Moderates
Narrows
Obstructs
Rests on
Sets the context for
Shapes
Stimulates
Structures

Accounts for (percentage of
variance)
Associated with
Correlated with
Increases / Decreases with
Predicts
Related to
Varies with

Because
Causes
Creates
Determines
Due to
Generates
Give rise to
Is a consequence of
Is a major proximate cause
behind
Is responsible for
Necessitated
Produces
Required
Resulted from
Springs from
Tipped
Triggered
Ultimate causal forces are
Was the driver for

Types of Causal Claims
Table 3 summarizes the prevalence of these three types of causal claims we found in our
sample, as well as the some of the language used to make such claims. Fully 76 percent
of the articles in our sample make their focal claims using IC or CC claims either in their
Abstracts or Discussion/Conclusion sections. If we consider articles that made such
claims in both their Abstracts as well as Discussion/Conclusion sections, the number falls
to 51 percent of the sample. The most prevalent causal claim used to make the article’s
focal claims is the CC type, which is prevalent in 57 percent of the articles in our sample.
These findings differ little between the two journals.
Causal Claims and Methodology
To assess the relationship between methodology and type of causal claim made, we
conducted logistic regression analysis of type of causal claim (in either Abtsract or
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Discussion/Conclusion on different methodologies.12 Although we recorded up to three
different types of methodologies, our analysis restricts us only to discussing net effects,
which obscure the effects of mixed methods. Further, because of the relatively small
number of articles in some of our methodology categories, we had to combine categories
in order for the analysis to be viable. Several patterns emerged from our analysis.
Table 3. Coding Causality: Summary of findings
AJS

Number of articles
Causal Claims
Initiating Causal (IC) Claims
Abstract
Discussion/Conclusion
Abstract or Discussion/Conclusion
Abstract and Discussion/Conclusion
Conditional Causal (CC) Claims
Abstract
Discussion / Conclusion
Abstract or Discussion/Conclusion
Abstract and Discussion/Conclusion
Probabilistic Causal (PC) Claims
Abstract
Discussion/Conclusion
Abstract or Discussion/Conclusion
Abstract and Discussion/Conclusion
IC or CC in Abstract or Discussion/Conclusion
IC or CC in Abstract and Discussion/Conclusion
No causal claim in any section
Shift in causal claim types across sections
Language-use
Causal Language in any section
Causal Language in focal claim
Mechanism Language in any section
Mechanism Language in focal claim

ASR

N

%

N

106

45%

127

31
27
40
18

29%
25%
38%
17%

45
48
59
34

%

Total
N

%

55%

233

100%

29
36
48
17

23%
28%
38%
13%

60
63
88
35

26%
27%
38%
15%

42%
45%
56%
32%

56
53
74
35

44%
42%
58%
28%

101
101
133
69

43%
43%
57%
30%

12
11
14
9
77
60
23
67

11%
10%
13%
8%
73%
57%
22%
63%

20
16
30
6
100
59
20
95

16%
13%
24%
5%
79%
46%
16%
75%

32
27
44
15
177
119
43
162

14%
12%
19%
6%
76%
51%
18%
70%

28
14
62
31

26%
13%
58%
29%

29
13
63
29

23%
10%
50%
23%

57
27
125
60

24%
12%
54%
26%

Note: Due to rounding, not all values sum to 100%.
Percentages shown for “Number of Articles” and for the “Total” column are percentages of the
total sample. Other percentages shown are within-journal.

IC claims were most likely to be made in articles that use either network analysis or
historical-comparative / historical-case methods. In comparison to our reference
category—cross-sectional data analysis, which was the dominant method used in the
sample—the use of either historical or network analysis increased an article’s odds of
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making an IC claim by more than 50 percent. In contrast, articles relying on ethnographic
or interview data, content/discourse analysis, or multi-level model analysis were
substantially less likely to make IC claims than articles based on cross-sectional data
analysis.
Examining CC claims revealed a different pattern. In comparison to articles
relying on cross-sectional data analysis, the odds of CC claims being found in the
article’s focal claims are considerably less in articles that are primarily theoretical or that
rely on formal/mathematical modeling. Otherwise, however, there were negligible
differences among the other methodology types in their likelihood of making CC claims.
The use of PC claims in making the article’s focal claims is more likely to be
found in articles using longitudinal/time-series or multi-level modeling in comparison to
those relying on cross-sectional analysis. Not surprisingly, PC claims are significantly
less likely to be made in articles relying on ethnographic, interview, discourse / content
analysis, or historical-comparative or historical-case methodologies.
Finally, some articles were more likely than others to make no causal claims in
their focal claims in either their Abstract or Discussion/Conclusion sections. Here, the
odds of articles relying on ethnographic, interview, discourse/content analysis
methodologies were more than 2.5 times greater than those for articles relying only on
cross-sectional data analysis. The odds were even greater (more than 8 times as much) for
theoretical or formal modeling-based articles.
Claims and Language
Table 3 (above) demonstrates that the use of literal causal language—“causes,” “causal,”
“causality”—is uncommon, with only 12 percent of focal claims containing such
language. (In 24 percent of the articles, such language appears elsewhere than in the
article’s main claims). The use of the word “mechanism” is much more common, with 26
percent of articles using the word in their central claims. Causal and mechanism language
is present in far more articles than use them in central claims. Usually the concept of
“mechanism” is used to refer to the processes identified in the focal claims of the article,
but not in these claims themselves. At times, articles that use these terms in places other
than their central claims express that they are unable to establish causality or specify
causal mechanisms (thus signaling an interest in, but inability to make, such causal
claims).
Is there a relationship between methodology and mechanisms-language? We
conducted further logistic regression analysis of mechanisms-language on
methodology.13 We found that on average, articles based solely on cross-sectional data
analysis have nearly the highest odds of referring to “mechanisms” in making the
article’s focal claims. Articles based on either longitudinal /time series analysis,
multilevel model analysis, or historical-comparative / historical-case analysis have
relatively
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relatively less but about equal odds of using this term in their central claims (at about 0.6
times that of articles based on cross-sectional data). In comparison, articles based on
ethnographic and interview data are the least likely to use this term in their central
claims.14
Overall, however, it is relatively uncommon for the causal claims themselves to
actually contain the language of causality or mechanisms. Instead, such articles more
often than not make causal claims using various metaphors such as those presented
earlier (Table 2).
ASSESSING THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ON CAUSALITY
With regard to the first research question guiding our study—What is the most common
view of causality in contemporary American sociology?—we found that it is the
Conditioning type of causal claim. Contrary to what reading some critics might lead one
to assume, the additive view of causality, which attempts to explain away a dependent
variable by accounting for the effects of the independent variables that produce it and
which is clearly expressed in PC claims, is the least common way in which contemporary
sociologists make causal claims. More prevalent, rather, are claims that express stronger
conceptions of causality—claims about factors that either shape conditions under which
outcomes are caused, or that are themselves causes of outcomes. Indeed, the vast majority
of articles made at least one IC or CC claim in their focal arguments. We also found that
it is rare for ASR and AJS articles to make causal claims in the form of if-then statements
or “one-liners” akin to positivistic laws (e.g. the sorts of claims that Porpora [2007] notes
characterize the approach of “rational choice” theorists).
Our second research question asked whether different types of causal claim
correlate highly with specific methodologies. We found that there are differences in the
likelihood of articles relying on certain methodologies to make certain types of causal
claims (or not to make causal claims at all) in their focal arguments. Some of these
findings may be unsurprising: articles relying on ethnographic / interview data or
discourse / content analysis are significantly less likely than large-N studies to make PC
claims. However, there are also findings that are difficult to explain: these very same
ethnography / interview-based articles are less likely than large-N studies to make either
IC or CC claims, and much more likely to make no causal claim in their focal claims.
The patterns we see in the relationship between methodology and causal claim are
not straightforward. For instance, causal claims of the CC type do not always come out of
comparative/historical research, as one might expect, and PC claims are not always found
in cross-sectional data-based articles. Such patterns may indicate conventions that govern
sociological analysis based on certain methodologies: articles based on qualitative
observational, interview, or content analysis tend to avoid IC or PC claims; articles based
on historical-comparative or -case analysis are relatively prone to using IC metaphors.
multilevel
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Multi-level model analysis and longitudinal / time series data-based articles have a
relatively high likelihood of using PC metaphors, even though one might think they have
more warrant to make “stronger” causal claims than articles based on cross-sectional
analysis. But our concern was not to assess whether the types of causal claims made were
warranted by the methodologies used, but primarily to map out the types of claims made.
Furthermore, with the dominant type of causal claim made (CC), we see considerably
less methodology-driven variation than with other types. Thus, while our findings reveal
some patterns indicating relationships between causal metaphors and methodology, they
challenge the argument that models of causality are simply a function of methodology. 15
Our third general research question asked whether “mechanisms” are a common
way to make causal claims, and whether their use is contingent on methodology. We
found that the language of mechanisms was used to make causal claims only about one
quarter of the time, even though mechanisms language was fairly prevalent in these
articles otherwise. We also found that articles based on some kinds of quantitative
methods (such as cross-sectional data analysis and network analysis) were more likely
than others to use this term, and articles based on some kinds of qualitative methods
(ethnography, interview, and discourse/content analysis) were relatively less likely, with
other methodologies falling in between. In at least some cases, it seemed to us as though
the use of the notion was employed to add a causal flavor to an otherwise “variabilistic”
argument, but this was not a general trend. We have not attempted to evaluate the lack of
conceptual clarity that others have insisted characterizes the notion of mechanism. Yet its
pervasiveness in articles bolsters Aro’s (1993) contention about its status as a “root
metaphor” in the discipline. In terms of causal language generally, we found the literal
use of causal terms (“causes,” “because,” “cause of”) to be rare when making causal
claims. Much more common is the use of other metaphors (“drives,” “produces,”
“mediates,” ”conditions”) to express causal relationships. In particular, we have found
that it is metaphors expressing Conditioning Causal arguments that are most prominent
contemporary American sociology.
METAPHOR AND TRUTH
It might be objected at this point that with our reflexive focus on cognition, we remove
any chance for causal claims to also be truth claims and for sociology to produce
knowledge of the social world. If the world consists of objects, that we access through
experience, that we understand through categories and concepts that are “true” if they
correspond to the properties in those objects, shouldn’t the language we use to express
these concepts and categories and their relationship to those objects be stated as clearly
and precisely as possible? Doesn’t the meaning of a scientific statement ultimately rest in
the objective conditions that make it true or false? How are metaphors and cognitive
models
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models not an obstruction of scientific knowledge in this regard?
Our main objection to these points is that they fail to consider sociologists as
cognitive agents and scientific arguments as a special type of cognitive representation.
For a cognitive approach, it is because we already “understand situations in terms of
concepts that we can understand causal statements using metaphors as true” (Lakoff and
Johnson, 1980, p. 172). In the same manner, we understand a scientific argument as true
by fitting our understanding of it to our understanding of its target-domain. Thus, the
truth of metaphors rests not on their connection with the inherent properties of objects but
on their fit with a preexisting understanding of those objects as part of a target-domain.
While this may seem to run counter to most epistemologies of causation, it is not
so unusual. As Hitchcock (2003) argues, even Hume’s influential empiricist formulation
couched causality in metaphor: consisting here of the “links” or “connexions” that are
“really to us the cement of the universe.” In this regard, the truth of Hume’s metaphors
about causal “links” and “connexions” is determined relative to his metaphoric
representation of the universe as a target-domain that consists of a kind of “cement.”
More recent philosophical theories of causation (by David Lewis, Wesley Salmon, J.L.
Mackie, among others) which focus on causal “connections,” “chains,” or “processes” are
metaphoric in a similar way, even if their metaphors have acquired technical meanings
that make them seem “dead.”16 In a similar manner, what the causal relationship actually
is is determined relative to what it can be on the basis of a preexisting understanding of
the target-domain where it applies. Given the cognitive importance of metaphors for
representing both causal relationships and the target-domains, truth therefore becomes “a
function of our conceptual system” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 179).
Yet, far from being subjectivist or merely “transitive,” this conceptual system
rests on a natural foundation. The preexisting understandings are derived both
experientially, from successful functioning in a physical and cultural environment, and
scientifically, or from participation in a scientific field. For scientific fields, the
preexisting understanding involves the “active preconditions” or “background”
assumptions and practices that, as a product of the history of a field, provide the basis for
making coherent knowledge claims (Fleck, 1981[1935], p. 40; Bourdieu, 1975; Abend et
al., 2013). There are many influences that shape and determine these preconditions
(including, we would argue, the experiential domain itself), however none of them negate
the importance of metaphor for making causal claims.
For our purposes, the main point is that the truth of causal statements, from a
cognitive standpoint, is largely a function of understanding in this respect, and therefore
involves a “passive” form of cognition that builds on the scaffolding provided by the
“active linkages” of background assumptions.17 The appeal of a causal argument lies in
ascertaining the relationship between its metaphors and this field-level understanding of
domain
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its target-domain.18 Mapping our understanding of the one onto our understanding of the
other becomes, in this regard, an essential precondition for cognitively making a
judgment of truth. Applying this to our sample, then, the relative prominence of the CC
prototype and its metaphors indicates a logic of fit between its entailments and a
preconception of the social world that currently resonates in the sociological field.19
CONCLUSION
Drawing from all articles published in AJS and ASR between 2006-2008, this paper has
provided an empirical and descriptive picture of causal usage in contemporary American
sociology, an initial typology of naturally-occurring causal claims in sociology, and
finally an argument for the forces that propelled the Conditioning type of causal claim to
dominance. Additionally, our data allowed us to test what we refer to as the conventional
wisdom about causality in sociology: whether it is used, how it is used, and the kinds of
factors that influence its usage in the field.
Our findings reveal the predominance of the Conditioning type of claim in the
metaphors used to make causal claims in the key arguments of the article. This finding
challenges the expectation that the dominant mode of causality would be “variabilistic”
(although whether the types of causal claims made are warranted by the methodologies
used—and hence whether there is indeed a “causal confusion” as Porpora [2007]
claims—we have not attempted to ascertain). Further, while we found some patterns in
the relationship between methodology and type of causal claim, the link between the two
is not straightforward. The dominant type of causal claim (CC) is just as likely to be
made in articles using varied kinds of qualitative and quantitative methodologies. While
there are certainly patterns indicating the likelihood of being associated with some
methodologies rather than others, on the whole the metaphors used in causal claims
cannot simply be reducible to methodology. Finally, we found that the use of various
ordinary metaphors (as identified in Table 2) was much more prevalent than the
previously identified root metaphor “mechanism” in making causal claims.
Our theoretical approach and coding efforts were determined by our effort not to
“minimize the cognitive” (Turner, 2007), and thus we define our approach in this article
as “cognitive” insofar as it remains consistent with the consensus view on how causation
works in human reasoning. From this perspective, causation is a process of forced
movement that is conceptualized with the aid of metaphors. These metaphors are
inference-rich, and their meaning is reflective of relationships in underlying cognitive
models. When mapped onto empirical target domains, they meaningfully structure the
relationships there as causal relationships.
The initial puzzle that pushed us toward cognition was the surprising role that
metaphors play in causal claims-making and the patterning we found there, with many of
the same metaphors used again and again to report empirical findings. Adding to this is
factual
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the fact that we didn’t find theories or other justifications that might lend conceptual
support for this usage. In this sense, the metaphors appeared to be ordered and naturally
occurring. Moreover, as mentioned above, our own coding efforts confirmed this point.
Disagreements over the causal meaning of metaphors were almost always initiated as
way of second-guessing what otherwise appeared, to each coder, as a metaphor with a
causal meaning.
As drawn from our data, the metaphors sociologists use to make empirical
claims are grouped together under cognitive models that, we argue, explain why that
usage is so consistent and structured. These cognitive models feature a unique causallogic, which credits different “determining factors” as responsible for the forced
movement observed in an empirical setting. We locate three models of this kind in causal
usage: the Initiating, which credits a forceful object that starts an unfolding causal
process; the Conditional, in which force is located in an environment to which affected
entities are exposed; and the Probabilistic, which also credits a forceful object, but with
an associative instead of initiating effect.
Based on this analysis, we derive three primary implications for understanding
causality in sociology. The first pertains to the neglect of the cognitive source of causal
claims-making in debates over causality. Philosophical argumentation about causation in
sociological research appears to miss what we have highlighted as a key factor: the role
of metaphors. Because of the similarity in the types of causal claims made by researchers,
it appears that their writing in these journals is only loosely coupled with—if not
altogether independent of—their own philosophical commitments (if any) about causality.
Second, although methodology does seem to have some relationship with whether
or not an article makes a causal claim at all, it does not completely determine the type of
causal usage. In other words, having accounted for the role of both theory and method, a
kind of excess of causal claims-making remains. We argue that this excess is cognitive
and that theoretical and methodological debates about causation in sociology have thus
far neglected it.
Finally, our approach reveals the problem of trying to determine “one true theory
(or method) of causation” when causation (as cognition) is radial and multiply realizable.
This suggests that tying causal claims to theory or method might not impact causal
claims-making in the discipline in the way theorists would like, specifically by unifying
its meaning and standardizing its usage (perhaps with the literal “X causes Y”). In fact,
we would argue that even if the field could be influenced so that causal claims would
typically be structured in this way, it would likely not eliminate the problems theorists
often find with causation (inconsistent usage, strange ontological presumptions, basic
illogic), nor would it necessarily lead these claims to be any stronger. On the contrary, the
sociological approach to causality could be amended instead through careful scrutiny and
critique of the metaphors that sociologists use and with what justification. 20 If
sociologists are in fact cognitive agents, this reveals an additional set of conditions under
which they produce social knowledge.
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Notes
1

The first two co-authors share authorship equally. Please direct correspondence to Brandon
Vaidyanathan (brandonv@rice.edu) or Michael Strand (mstrand@bgsu.edu).
2
The one exception is Abend et al. (2013), which empirically examines “styles of causal thought”
in ethnographic articles.
3
Here we follow the programmatic view of reflexivity that it involves “[taking] as one’s topic
one’s target’s resource” (Zammito, 2004, p. 2; emphasis original).
4
Indeed, our coding (described below) was remarkably consistent in identifying these metaphors
as bearing a causal meaning in the sites where they were used In fact, it was only when we
subsequently enlisted a theory about what causation is or should be (like critical realism or
empiricism) that our coding efforts, which we will describe further below, became most
equivocal.
5 The larger point to make, especially for sociology, is that retaining an anti-realist view of the
mind by remaining tied to discourse, particularly as the conceptual basis for reflexive analysis in
the sociology of science and knowledge, has diminishing returns given the collapse of
behaviorism in psychology and the corresponding rise of the “cognitive revolution” (Gardner,
1985).
6
However, Cartwright doesn’t try to boil these “thick” terms down to any more basic meaning,
making it difficult to see why, from her perspective, metaphors in science aren’t simply just good
writing
7
In this sense, we classify the metaphors as gestalt: the complex of properties occurring together
is more basic to their meaning than their separate occurrences.
8
We have coded articles included in special issues as we would any other article, on the
assumption that these issues are evenly distributed and the articles that comprise them are
representative of the sort of articles that tend to appear in regular issues of each journal. We did
not, however, include as articles Commentary and Reply, Editors’ Comments, Presidential
Addresses, Book Reviews, or Review Essays. The editorship of AJS did not change hands during
this timeframe while the ASR editorial position changed hands once, in 2006/2007. Our analysis
suggests this transition had no discernible effect on the articles within ASR. Indeed, when one
considers review time and a reasonable backlog, any potential impact would not emerge for at
least two years.
9
9 In initial rounds of coding, we gathered data from Introduction sections, but such sections
varied considerably in their styles across articles, and did not consistently present the article’s
main objectives or research questions. For similar reasons, we did not code the “results” or
“findings” sections of articles.
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10

It bears mentioning that the IC, CC, and PC types are the metaphors boiled down to prototypes.
They might strike some as overly broad and encompassing “umbrella categories” that allow little
conceptual leverage, particularly for comparisons. But they allow us to elucidate the conceptual
meaning of the broadest range of metaphors that fall within their orbit. Further research might the
boil the metaphors down even further and discover patterning at a lower conceptual level.
11
The utility of such a typology can be seen in its absence. Smilde and May (2010) coded for
causality in a recent review of the literature on the sociology of religion. Their approach captured
every instance in which a “causal logic” was employed. But this term is not defined by the
authors. Their findings—that 90 percent of the articles utilize a causal logic—suggests they
simply coded all clearly specified independent variable-dependent variable relationships as
exhibiting a “causal logic.” While we applaud the effort to code for causal relationships, we
suggest our typology provides considerably more leverage.
12
Tables are available from the authors upon request.
13
Supplemental tables are available from the authors upon request.
14
This finding is also corroborated by Abend et al. [2013, p. 16n12], who found ethnographic
articles in their sample to seldom use the term “mechanism”—even though they might actually be
describing these in other words—in comparison to quantitative articles, which were more likely
to use the term.
15
Whether models of causality employed ought to be strongly related to methodology is a
separate question that we will not address here.
16
While the metaphoric significance of these concepts may appear weak, consider the different
entailments involved in rendering a “chain of causation” versus a “rope of causation” (Hitchcock,
2003, p. 2).
17
Our argument here is pure Fleckian: “Cognition therefore means, primarily, to ascertain those
results which must follow, given certain preconditions. The preconditions correspond to active
linkages and constitute the portion of cognition belonging to the collective. The constrained
results correspond to passive linkages and constitute that which is experienced as an objective
reality. The act of ascertaining is the contribution of the individual” (Fleck, 1981[1935], p. 40).
18
For example, the truth-claim “class mediates the effect of race on income” maps onto a targetdomain according to which class (as a discrete entity) is possible to categorize as having the kind
of effect that the metaphor “mediates” entails.
19
In ancillary analyses (available from the authors upon request), we examined a sample of
articles from 1960–1990. These findings suggest that an influential set of background
assumptions about sociology’s target-domain can be traced to the “New Causal Theorists” (NCT)
and their entry into the American sociological field at a pivotal time during the 1960s (Mullins,
1973; Bernert, 1983; Turner and Turner, 1990). While it is beyond the scope of this paper to fully
develop these points, we find a systematic correspondence between the CC prototype and
metaphors of the kind “conditions,” “affects,” “shapes,” “mediates,” and “contributes to” and the
NCT view that the social world consists of “fixed entities with variable attributes” (Abbott, 1988,
p. 169).
20
See Lizardo (2013) for an example of a metaphor critique, regarding the “structure” metaphor.
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